University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

ScholarWorks @ UTRGV
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications
and Presentations

Robert C. Vackar College of Business &
Entrepreneurship

2-26-2018

The plough, gender roles, and corruption
Gautam Hazarika
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac
Part of the Finance Commons

Recommended Citation
Hazarika, Gautam. “The Plough, Gender Roles, and Corruption.” Economics of Governance 19, no. 2
(February 26, 2018): 141–63. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-018-0202-7.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business &
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics and Finance Faculty
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information,
please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu.

The Plough, Gender Roles, and Corruption
1. Introduction
Cross-national empirical studies of corruption commonly find significant correlation between
indices of corruption and women’s participation in the labour force and politics. Nations in which
women play a greater role in economic and public life are found to suffer less corruption. A causal
relationship, that the greater participation of women in the labor force and politics reduces national
corruption, has been inferred. This has been controversial in that, first, it is possible unobserved
aspects of national institutions and attitudes affect both corruption and women’s participation in the
labor force and politics, so that the observed correlation between gender and corruption is spurious,
and, second, that corruption may obstruct women’s participation in the labor force and politics, so
that there is reverse causality. Instrumental variables estimation might have settled the controversy
but for the difficulty of finding credible instruments. This paper argues that a potential instrument
may be found in historical geography. A recent study by Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
uncovers support for Boserup’s (1970) hypothesis that the ancient adoption of the plow, a heavy
implement better suited to use by men, led to a gendered division of labor by which women made
their economic contributions from home, and that this gave rise to persistent cultural norms
prescribing domesticity in women. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) discover that countries in
which a greater proportion of the population traces its ancestry to ethnic groups who adopted the
plow continue to see lower women’s participation in the labor force and politics. This suggests that
the geographical suitability of national ancestral lands to crops benefited by the use of the plow, is a
potential instrument for women’s participation in economic and public life. Its use, it is
demonstrated, yields a much weaker and statistically insignificant relationship between gender and
corruption. The paper concludes that ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficients of
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regressors measuring women’s economic and political influence, in regressions in which measured
corruption is the dependent variable, are substantially biased.
Swamy’s, Knack’s, Lee’s, and Azfar’s (2001) pioneering study of gender and corruption made
the striking discovery that countries in which women make up larger shares of parliament, ministers,
and the labour force are perceived to suffer less corruption. This was closely followed by Dollar’s,
Fisman’s, and Gatti’s (2001) finding that perceived national corruption is negatively related to the
proportion of parliamentary seats held by women. Whereas Swamy et al. (2001) were agnostic as to
the reasons for correlation between gender and corruption, Dollar et al. (2001) suggested women are
intrinsically more trustworthy and public-spirited than men. As shall be discussed, this has proven a
contentious thesis. This nascent literature was then agitated by a dissenting opinion. Sung (2003)
argued that the hitherto observed correlation between gender and corruption was spurious in being
caused by correlation between a third factor, namely, liberal democracy, and each of gender and
corruption. While Swamy et al. (2001) controlled for national political freedoms and Dollar et al.
(2001) for civil liberties, these measured liberal democracy inadequately, contended Sung (2003). In
other words, the regression errors in the analyses by Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001)
included unmeasured aspects of liberal democracy correlated with women’s empowerment, leading
to bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the effects of gender upon corruption. Sung
demonstrated that once liberal democracy is extensively controlled for, women’s representation in
ministerial cabinets, sub-ministerial officialdom, and parliament are reduced to statistically
insignificant correlates of corruption.
Correlation between the regression error and measures of women’s participation in the
labour force and politics may also result from reverse causality. Bjarnegard (2013) argues that
corruption within political parties, consisting of ‘clientelism’, the exchange of personal favours for
political support, is an impediment to women’s participation in politics. Such corruption relies on
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networks, access to which requires a type of social capital, termed ‘homosocial’ capital, built on
relationships between men. It is naturally difficult for female political aspirants to break into these
masculine networks. Also, as noted by Frank, Lambsdorff, and Boehm (2011), corruption may
hamper legal institutions’ ability to protect women against discrimination in the labour market and
politics.
There are two approaches to addressing correlation between the error term and measures of
women’s participation in economic and public life in a regression in which a gauge of national
corruption is the dependent variable. If the endogeneity is due to inclusion in the regression error of
unobserved aspects of national institutions and attitudes correlated with women’s influence in the
economy and politics, these aspects might be treated as country fixed-effects provided a time series
of data were available. This is the tactic of Debski and Jetter (2015). The authors consider values of
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for the years 1998-2011 to constitute a
time series. By their country fixed effects model, greater participation by women in economic and
public life is not associated with perceptions of less corruption. This finding might have been a
valuable contribution to the literature but for the authors’ error in considering values of the
Corruption Perception Index to be intertemporally comparable. Transparency International warns
that “CPI scores before 2012 are not comparable across time” 1. Intertemporal incomparability is a
weakness as well of the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index. Further, even if suitable time
series data were available, fixed effects estimation wouldn’t be a solution to the problem of reverse
causality.
Instrumental variables (IV) estimation is the other approach to addressing the potential
endogeneity of measures of women’s influence in the economy and politics. A valid instrument must
be uncorrelated with unobserved influences upon corruption. It must also be correlated with
women’s participation in economic and public life, and it mustn’t itself be a direct influence upon
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corruption. There is to date only one published account, by Chen (2013), of IV estimation of the
effects of gender upon corruption. There are, broadly, two parliamentary electoral systems in the
world’s democracies: majoritarian representation and proportional representation. In the
majoritarian system, there is only one parliamentary seat per district. Hence, each political party
fields but one candidate per district, and the candidate who wins the most votes is elected to
parliament. On the other hand, there are multiple parliamentary seats per district in the proportional
system. The proportion of these that a party wins is equal to the share of total votes cast in its
favour. For example, a party winning 40% of total votes in a 10-seat district will have gained 4 of
these 10 seats. Chen (2013) argues that political parties are likelier to field female candidates when
the system of representation is proportional. She reasons that, first, political parties, long dominated
by men, will tend to field male candidates when electoral rules permit but one candidate per district,
and, second, that parties are likelier to include women in their field of candidates in multi-seat
districts in order to better attract female voters. Chen (2013) demonstrates that the proportion of
women in parliament is significantly lower in democracies with majoritarian representation. She
proceeds to use an indicator of this form of representation, together with an indicator of the
institution of gender quotas in democracies with proportional representation, as instruments for the
share of parliamentary seats held by women in a regression in which Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index is the dependent variable. This strategy yields the finding that women’s
participation in politics significantly reduces corruption. However, the validity of Chen’s (2013)
identifying instruments is questionable. Proportional representation was devised as a solution to the
particular weakness of the majoritarian system that it is possible for the victor in a multi-party race
to have won a minority of the vote, that is, possible for parliament to be unrepresentative of the full
diversity of national political opinion. It might be argued that a nation that recognises this
shortcoming and acts to remedy it by adopting proportional representation likely possesses
5

progressive institutions and attitudes intolerant of corruption. After all, proportional representation
is the dominant electoral system of the liberal democracies of Western Europe famed for their good
governance. In other words, an indicator of majoritarian representation may be correlated with the
regression error.
This study too employs IV estimation to address the potential endogeneity of measures of
women’s participation in economic and public life, but its choice of instrument, based on nations’
ancestral geography, is more readily defended. Whereas a country’s electoral system is chosen by its
polity, there is arguably little that is volitional about its ancestral geography, so that the likelihood of
correlation between it and unobserved aspects of national institutions and attitudes with bearing on
corruption, is remote. The particular feature of ancestral geography made use of is the suitability of
nations’ ancestral lands to crops benefited by the use of the plough, that is, ‘plough-positive’ crops
in Pryor’s (1985) parlance. Boserup (1970) proposed that the adoption of the plough in antiquity
may have given rise to cultural norms prescribing domesticity in women that persist to this day. The
plough, a heavy implement drawn by powerful draft animals difficult to control, is better suited to
use by men. So its adoption may have led to a gendered division of labour by which women made
their economic contributions from home. Perhaps it gradually came to be believed that women’s
proper place was the home. Indeed, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) find that there is less female
labour force participation, women’s ownership of businesses, and women’s representation in
parliament in countries in which a greater proportion of the population traces its ancestry to ethnic
groups that took up the plough. Since the plough was likelier to have been adopted in regions better
suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops, it is likely that women’s participation in economic and public life is
correlated with the suitability of nations’ ancestral lands to such crops. In other words, not only is
this feature of ancestral geography likely exogenous, it is also likely correlated with women’s
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representation in the labour force and politics. This study finds that its use as an instrument turns
the estimated relationship between gender and corruption statistically insignificant.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Since problematic explanations may be
symptomatic of suspect findings, section 2 critiques existing explanations of statistically significant
correlation between gender and corruption in cross-national OLS regressions. Section 3 explains
Boserup’s (1970) thesis of a connection between the ancient adoption of the plough and modern
gender roles, and describes its testing by Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), with a view to
establishing the plausibility of this study’s choice of instrument. Section 4 describes the data and
presents estimates, both OLS and IV, of the effects of gender upon corruption towards
demonstrating that OLS estimates are substantially biased. Section 5 summarises the study’s findings
and presents its conclusions.

2. Gender and Corruption: Problematic Explanations
Commonly sizeable and significant OLS estimates of the effects of gender upon corruption
have led researchers to conclude that women are either morally superior to men, more averse to the
risk of being caught, or less endowed with opportunities for corruption. Of these explanations, the
first has inspired conspicuous policy initiatives in parts of the world. For example, units of the traffic
police forces of Lima and Mexico City and the customs service of Mexico have been feminised. The
view that the induction of women into officialdom shall reduce corruption because of women’s
moral superiority is, incidentally, the reverse of older views of feminine morality. For instance, both
Plato and Aristotle held that women, since they were considered ruled by emotion, were morally
inferior to men2. This view was shared by Eastern philosophers as well, such as the ancient Indian
statesman-philosopher Kautilya3. Goetz (2007) drily notes that “the very traits that branded women
as deficient in moral development, their concern to help and to please, are now seen as functional
7

for good governance reforms in developing and transitional societies”. In other words, traits
ascribed to women once viewed as making for moral weakness are now seen as cornerstones of
moral strength, that is, the definition of morality has changed. It may make little sense to consider
women morally superior if notions of morality are mutable. Perhaps it is more useful to speak of
honesty than morality. Are women more honest than men?
Crime statistics supply a partial answer. By the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime
statistics, women made up only 26.54% of all arrests in 20134. Men dominated all categories of crime
save ‘prostitution and commercialized vice’. Men overwhelmingly dominated violent crime, but this
may not be informative of gender differences in honesty since men may be more socialised, even
hormonally predisposed, to violence. What of gender differences in arrests for non-violent crimes?
While more men than women were arrested for non-violent crimes as well in 2013, the gender gaps
were perhaps tellingly small in some categories. For example, women made up 39.9% of arrests for
‘fraud’, 43.1% of arrests for ‘larceny-theft’, and 48.4% of arrests for ‘embezzlement’. It has been
argued that crime isn’t merely the outcome of the perpetrators’ proclivities to dishonesty. There
must be opportunity as well, and women may have fewer criminal opportunities than men, so that it
is possible women shall be as likely as men to commit non-violent crime when there is no gender
gap in opportunity. Perhaps this is why women made up virtually half of all arrests for
embezzlement. As writes Dodge (2013), “the high number of women embezzlers is attributed to
workplace opportunities that involve low-level occupations such as bookkeepers, bank tellers, or
secretaries who have access to company funds”. In sum, crime statistics don’t strongly point to
women’s greater honesty.
Besides, social science experiments on honesty have been inconclusive. Frank’s,
Lambsdorff’s, and Boehm’s (2011) survey of laboratory experiments on gender and corruption
infers that “women are not necessarily more intrinsically honest or averse to corruption than men”.
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A similar survey by Chaudhuri (2012) finds that “the evidence for greater incorruptibility on the part
of women comes primarily from developed nations” with no “strong differences in developing
countries where the problem of corruption is far more endemic”. There is traditional empirical
evidence as well of the lack of a gender difference in corruptibility in the developing world. For
example, Vijaylakshmi (2007) finds “no significant gender difference in attitudes towards rentseeking or in actual levels of corruption between male and female representatives” in Indian local
government. Since it may not then be asserted that women are universally more honest than men,
significant correlation between gender and corruption in cross-national OLS regressions must be
explained by either women’s greater risk aversion or their relatively fewer opportunities for
corruption. These explanations are problematic as well in that they don’t inspire meaningful policy.
Laboratory experiments on corruption have tended to find that women are significantly less
inclined to dishonesty than men when there is risk of discovery and penalty (e.g., Schulze and Frank,
2003). Indeed, Croson’s and Gneezy’s (2009) survey of research upon gender differences in
preferences concludes that “men are more risk-taking than women in most tasks and most
populations”. If women are less prone to dishonesty than men only when there is risk of discovery
and punishment, the recruitment of women into officialdom in corruption-wracked developing
countries, where such risk is presumably low, is unlikely to improve governance. The explanation
that women have less opportunity for corruption too doesn’t make for effectual policy since, as
noted by Goetz (2007), more women in officialdom may well expand women’s opportunities for
corruption by facilitating the formation of all-female networks of corruption or the subjugation of
male-dominated networks by female leaders.
In sum, statistically significant correlation between gender and corruption in cross-national
analyses that ignore the potential endogeneity of women’s influence in the economy and politics has
elicited problematic explanations. The explanation that women are inherently more honest than men
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isn’t unambiguously supported by non-violent crime statistics, social science experiments, or surveybased empirical analyses. On the other hand, while the explanations that women are more riskaverse than men, or relatively lacking in opportunity for corruption, are plausible, they don’t make
for effective policy solutions to the scourge of corruption in developing and transitional economies.

3. The Plough and Gender Roles
The Danish agricultural economist Esther Boserup, renowned for her pioneering work on
gender and development, believed there was a link between agriculture by the mean of the plough
and cultural norms governing gender roles. Her observations of rural life in the developing world led
her to note that regions home to plough agriculture “show a predominantly male family labour
force, because a large proportion of women in the cultivator families are completely exempted from
work in the fields. The land is prepared for sowing by men using draught animals, and this thorough
land preparation leaves little need for weeding the crop, which is usually the women’s task.
Therefore women contribute mainly to harvest work and to the care of domestic animals. Because
village women work less in agriculture, a considerable proportion of them are completely freed from
farm work. Sometimes such women perform only domestic duties, living in seclusion within their
own homes, and appearing in the village street only under the protection of the veil, a phenomenon
associated with plough culture, and seemingly unknown in regions of shifting cultivation where
women do most of the agricultural toil” (Boserup, 1970). The plough may have led to the
masculinisation of agriculture for at least three reasons. First, it is a heavy implement drawn by
powerful animals difficult to control. Second, since it severs the roots of weeds, its use greatly
reduces the need for weeding, traditionally in the realm of women, and, third, since small children in
the vicinity of its operation may be injured by it, and ploughing may not be frequently and
unexpectedly interrupted, the plough isn’t suited to use by persons whose other responsibility is
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childcare. Boserup theorised that, since the plough’s masculinisation of agriculture must have held as
well in antiquity, plough cultures eventually developed beliefs that women’s proper place was the
home, that is, norms prescribing a domestic role for women in society. This thesis has lately been
tested by Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), who find that, even once contemporary economic
conditions are controlled for, women’s participation in the labour force, entrepreneurship, and
politics is lower in countries in which a larger fraction of the population is descended from ethnic
groups who adopted the plough, and that this pattern even survives emigration in that there is less
labour force participation among the daughters of migrants to the US and Europe from countries in
which the ancestral use of the plough was more widespread.
It is naturally likely that the plough was first adopted in areas ecologically suited to its use.
Pryor (1985) distinguishes between ‘plough-positive’ and ‘plough-negative’ crops. The former,
whose cultivation is greatly benefited by the use of the plough, are crops, such as wheat, barley, rye,
and buckwheat, requiring large tracts of land to be rapidly prepared for sowing and soils that aren’t
shallow, sloped, or rocky. The latter include such crops as millet and sorghum, whose seeds don’t
need to be buried in furrows or deep holes, and corn, which is so calorie-rich that sufficient calories
for subsistence are yielded by a relatively small plot of land. Pryor observes that ‘plough-positive’ or
‘plough-negative’ crops may be ecologically impossible to grow in parts of the world. In other
words, there is spatial heterogeneity in ecological suitability to crops benefited by the plough.
Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) develop a measure of the ecological suitability of a
nation’s ancestral lands to ‘plough-positive’ crops. First, they identify the various ethnic groups
comprising the nation. They then procure the geographical coordinates of these groups’ ethnic
centroids, the places whence they originated, from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, a global database of
1,265 ethnic groups. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn consider land within 200 kilometers of each such
centroid the concerned ethnic group’s ancestral land. They use the UN Food and Agricultural
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Organization’s (FAO) Global Agro-Ecological Zones 2002 database to calculate the share of each ethnic
group’s ancestral land suited to the cultivation of ‘plough-positive’ crops. Finally, they calculate the
share of the nation’s ancestral lands suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops as the weighted mean of the
shares of its constituent ethnic groups’ ancestral lands suited to such crops, the weights being these
groups’ shares in the national population.
The use of this variable as an instrument has recent precedent. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn
(2013), concerned that their finding of a cross-national negative relationship between historical
plough agriculture and women’s current participation in the labour force, entrepreneurship, and
politics is driven by unobserved heterogeneity, employ the variable as an instrument for the actual
historical use of the plough. As argued, the variable is a potential instrument as well for women’s
participation in economic and pubic life in cross-national regressions in which a gauge of corruption
is the dependent variable. After all, ancestral geography is likely a historical accident. On the other
hand the suitability to ‘plough-positive’ crops, hence the actual historical use of the plough, may
have led to more rapid economic and political development conducive to the rise of progressive
institutions and attitudes hostile to corruption, but it is possible to mitigate this difficulty by
controlling for both current and ancestral economic and political development.

4. Data and Empirical Findings
Table 1 presents the sample mean values of all the variable utilised in the analysis. National
corruption is measured by the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI) for 2013. It gauges
“perceptions of the extent to which pubic power is exercised for private gain, including petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests”. Nations
with higher values of this indicator are perceived to be less corrupt. The CCI has been a common
measure of national corruption in empirical work. Women’s participation in economic life is
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measured by the national female labour force participation rate, defined as the percentage of the
female population aged at least 15 in the labour force. Women’s participation in public life is
measured in two ways: the percentage of ministerial level positions held by women in 2012, and the
percentage of parliamentary seats held by women in 2013. As discussed, the study’s identifying
instrument is the percentage of national ancestral lands suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops, that is,
crops benefited by the use of the plough. The other variables employed in the analysis are largely
identical, or akin, to the correlates of corruption discussed by Treisman (2007). For example, since
corruption may be linked to the size of economic rents appropriable by bureaucrats and politicians,
the analysis controls for the share of natural resources rents in GDP, as well as the share of
international trade in GDP since trade-led competition shrinks monopoly rents. Similarly, since it
has been hypothesised that corruption in many developing nations today is a legacy of venal
extractive forms of colonialism, dummy variables describing historical colonial status are included in
the analysis, as is the share of the population descended from Europeans since European settlement
in former colonies was typically accompanied by the founding of beneficent institutions.
In order to minimise the possibility of correlation between this instrument and unobserved
progressive institutions and attitudes arising from the perhaps more rapid economic and political
development generated by the use of the plough, measures of both current and ancestral economic
and political development are included in the analysis. Current levels of economic and political
development are measured, respectively, by per capita income and the Polity democracy score.
Ancestral economic and political development are controlled for as follows. An ethnic group’s level
of ancestral economic development is measured by an index of its historical settlement pattern taken
from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas. It ranges in value from 1 to 8, with 1 representing a fully
nomadic existence and 8 complex settlement. For each nation, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
calculate the weighted average of the values of this index pertaining to its constituent ethnicities, the
13

weights being the population shares of these ethnicities. In like fashion, an ethnic group’s level of
ancestral political development is gauged by an index of its levels of political hierarchy. This index,
also taken from the Ethnographic Atlas, ranges in value from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating no jurisdictional
hierarchies beyond the local community and 5 indicating four levels of such hierarchies. For each
nation, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) similarly compute the weighted average of the values of
this index pertaining to its constituent ethnicities.
Table 2 presents baseline OLS estimates of the determinants of corruption. These are
indicative of a statistically significant connection between gender and corruption across countries:
those in which more women participate in the labour force and a greater share of ministerial level
positions and parliamentary seats are held by women are perceived to be less corrupt. Table 3
presents OLS estimates relating to the baseline regression equations augmented to include a variety
of historical controls of which the aforementioned measures of nations’ ancestral levels of economic
and political development are a part. Once again, the potentially erroneous treatment of the
regressors gauging women’s representation in the labour force and politics as exogenous yields a
statistically significant positive relationship between each and the CCI. Next, variables gauging
contemporary economic conditions are added as regressors. The ensuing estimates, presented in
table 4, too indicate that the ignoring of the potential endogeneity of women’s participation in
economic and public life results in a statistically significant association between gender and
corruption. Table 5 presents OLS estimates pertaining to the regression equations thus far
augmented to include a selection of socio-cultural controls. As before, the treatment as exogenous
of women’s participation in the labour force and their representation in ministerial cabinets results in
their statistical significance. However, it appears that controlling for the fraction of Protestants in
the population turns women’s representation in parliament statistically insignificant. This is probably
because the Protestant nations of Northern Europe are characterised by both very low levels of
14

corruption (high values of the CCI) and high women’s representation in parliament. It is notable
that neither Swamy et al. (2001) nor Dollar et al. (2001) control for the extent of Protestantism.
Weber (1930) famously wrote of a ‘Protestant Ethic’ whose hallmark was worldly asceticism. Indeed,
Weber describes Protestants as having abolished the Catholic monasteries only to turn the world
into one. It is likely that this way of life was inimical to corruption. Further, as described by Berger
(2010), Pentecostal Protestants in Latin America seem to have fostered a culture less sexist than that
of their Catholic compatriots. In other words, Protestantism may be associated with more egalitarian
gender norms. Hence, the omission of this control by Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001)
may have led to their overestimation of the effect of women’s parliamentary representation upon
measured corruption. In sum, once socio-cultural factors are extensively controlled for, only the
female labour force participation rate and the percentage of ministerial level positions held by
women, treated as exogenous, remain statistically significant correlates of perceived corruption. This
study shall next explore the robustness of these two variables’ statistical significance to IV
estimation.
In keeping with Boserup’s (1970) hypothesis, the estimates in table 6 indicate that ancestral
geographical suitability to crops benefited by the use of the plough is significantly negatively
associated with women’s representation in the labour force and politics. Hence, not only is ancestral
geography likely exogenous, it is also strongly correlated with these potentially endogenous measures
of women’s economic and political influence. Table 7 presents two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimates, analogous to the OLS estimates in columns (1) and (2) of table 5, the identifying
instrument being nations’ ancestral suitability to ‘plough-positive’ crops. By these, neither women’s
participation in the labour force nor their representation in ministerial cabinets is a significant
correlate of perceived corruption. Note that the 2SLS point estimates of these regressors are,
respectively, 89% and 91% smaller than their OLS counterparts. It is concluded that OLS estimates
15

of the effects of gender upon corruption are substantially biased. These IV estimates also indicate
that there is significantly less corruption in countries with greater per capita incomes, and, curiously,
more corruption in countries whose adult populations are more educated. Perhaps its lack of
emphasis upon ethics is a weakness of modern education. Corruption is perceived to be significantly
lower in more open economies, and higher in nations more ethnically fractionalised. Finally, both
Christianity and Islam appear associated with less corruption.

5. Conclusion
The principal contribution of this paper to the body of research upon gender and corruption
is its treatment of women’s participation in economic and public life as endogenous. As argued, such
endogeneity may be the result of unobserved influences upon corruption being factors also in
women’s representation in the labour force and politics, or the consequence of reverse causality, that
is, the effect of corruption upon women’s ease of entry into the labour force or politics. Previous
attempts to address this endogeneity, OLS with country fixed-effects (Debski and Jetter, 2015) and
instrumental variables estimation (Chen, 2013), have not been convincing. On the other hand, this
study’s use of ancestral geography, arguably a historical accident, as the identifying instrument in IV
estimation of the effects of gender upon corruption is a plausible strategy. The ensuing estimates
indicate that gender is a statistically insignificant correlate of corruption. Hence, this study’s findings
are not supportive of policy initiatives to increase women’s influence in economic and public life
toward combatting corruption. While such initiatives remain valuable, their value may lie in their
promotion of equity, not efficiency.
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Table 1

Sample Means
Variable
The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 (negatively related to
perceived corruption)
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%) – The World Bank
percentage of ministerial level positions held by women in 2012 – The World Bank
percentage of parliamentary seats held by women 2013 – The World Bank
percentage of national ancestral lands suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops – Alesina,
Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
log of per capita gross national income PPP in 2013 – The World Bank
average years of schooling in 2010 of those 15 or older - Barro and Lee (2013)
Polity2 index of democracy in 2013 – Center for Systemic Peace
former British colony
former French colony
never colonised
formerly (or currently) a communist country
proportion of national ancestral lands suited to agriculture – Alesina, Giuliano, and
Nunn (2013)
ancestral political development (index of hierarchical levels) – Alesina, Giuliano,
and Nunn (2013)
ancestral economic development (index of settlement patterns) – Alesina, Giuliano,
and Nunn (2013)
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank
international trade as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank
value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank
value added in industry as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank
percentage of national land area that is potentially arable - FAO
measure of national ethnic fractionalisation – Alesina, Devleeschauwer, and
Easterly (2003)
percentage of the population of European descent – Nunn and Puga (2012)
percentage of Catholics in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Protestants in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of other Christian sects in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Muslims in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Hindus in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006)
continent = Asia
continent = Europe
continent = North America
continent = Oceania
continent = South America
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Obs. Mean
207
-0.008

S.D.
0.998

186
184
187
203

52.766
17.180
19.728
0.485

16.060
11.917
11.684
0.414

188
146
165
194
196
195
241
215

8.666
8.347
4.188
0.327
0.153
0.144
0.216
54.189

1.464
2.810
6.159
0.469
0.401
0.352
0.412
33.387

228

3.304

1.040

228

6.380

1.381

180
176
164
164
161
189

10.531
95.003
12.942
28.220
42.724
0.441

13.383
54.272
12.247
13.727
27.591
0.258

169
189
189
189
189
189
240
240
240
240
240

32.201
0.289
0.139
0.085
0.233
0.022
0.221
0.208
0.163
0.108
0.063

41.715
0.332
0.209
0.112
0.346
0.095
0.416
0.407
0.370
0.311
0.243

Table 2

Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –
Baseline Controls
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013
Variable

(1)

Constant

OLS Coefficient Estimates
(2)
(3)

-6.056***
(0.435)

Key Regressors
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%)
- The World Bank
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012
- The World Bank
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013
- The World Bank
Baseline Controls
log of per capita gross national income PPP in 2013
- The World Bank
average years of schooling in 2010 of those 15 or older
- Barro and Lee (2013)
Polity2 index of democracy in 2013
- Center for Systemic Peace
Continent dummy variables
Adjusted R-squared
N

-5.046***
(0.319)

-5.175***
(0.369)

0.014***
(0.004)

0.022***
(0.005)

0.014**
(0.006)

0.666***

0.570***

0.603***

-0.061*

-0.041

-0.043

0.034***

0.030***

0.034***

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.71
131

0.72
127

0.69
127

(0.057)
(0.032)
(0.010)

(0.057)
(0.029)
(0.010)

(0.059)
(0.031)
(0.011)

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 3

Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –
Baseline & Historical Controls
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013
Variable

(1)

Constant

OLS Coefficient Estimates
(2)
(3)

-6.175***
(0.530)

Key Regressors
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012
- The World Bank
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013
- The World Bank
percentage of women in parliament 2013
- The World Bank
Historical Controls
former British colony

-5.591***
(0.484)

-5.830***
(0.505)

0.013***
(0.004)

0.021***
(0.005)

0.017**
(0.006)

0.190

0.095

0.158

former French colony

0.176

0.161

0.095

never colonised

0.081

-0.008

0.099

formerly (or currently) a communist country

-0.192

-0.099

-0.074

proportion of national ancestral lands suited to
agriculture - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
ancestral political development (index of hierarchical
levels) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
ancestral economic development (index of settlement
patterns) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
Baseline Controls

0.002

0.004*

0.004*

-0.010

-0.054

-0.071

0.047

0.084**

0.111**

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R-squared
N

0.71
128

0.73
124

0.71
124

(0.169)
(0.173)
(0.217)
(0.181)
(0.002)
(0.079)
(0.041)

(0.183)
(0.189)
(0.198)
(0.166)
(0.002)
(0.074)
(0.041)

(0.173)
(0.187)
(0.206)
(0.151)
(0.002)
(0.073)
(0.043)

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 4

Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –
Baseline, Historical, & Contemporary Economic Controls
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013
Variable

(1)

Constant

OLS Coefficient Estimates
(2)
(3)

-5.764***
(0.854)

Key Regressors
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%)
- The World Bank
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012
- The World Bank
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013
- The World Bank
Contemporary Economic Controls
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
international trade as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
value added in industry as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
percentage of national land area that is potentially arable
- FAO
Baseline Controls
Historical Controls
Adjusted R-squared
N

-6.133***
(0.836)

-5.942***
(0.913)

0.013***
(0.004)

0.019***
(0.005)

0.012**
(0.006)

-0.012*

-0.014**

-0.007

0.003**

0.003***

0.004***

0.005

0.015*

0.011

-0.012

-0.005

-0.012

-0.004

-0.001

-0.003

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

0.78
108

0.79
105

0.77
104

(0.007)
(0.001)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.003)

(0.007)
(0.001)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.003)

(0.007)
(0.001)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.003)

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 5

Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –
Baseline, Historical, Contemporary Economic, & Socio-Cultural Controls
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013
Variable

(1)

Constant

OLS Coefficient Estimates
(2)
(3)

-6.433***
(0.962)

Key Regressors
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%)
- The World Bank
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012
- The World Bank
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013
- The World Bank
Socio-Cultural Controls
measure of national ethnic fractionalisation
- Alesina, Devleeschauwer, and Easterly (2003)
percentage of the population of European descent
- Nunn and Puga (2012)
percentage of Catholics in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Protestants in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of other Christian sects in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Muslims in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Hindus in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
Baseline Controls
Historical Controls
Contemporary Economic Controls
Adjusted R-squared
N

-6.128***
(0.985)

-5.380***
(1.115)

0.018***
(0.005)

0.016***
(0.006)

0.003
(0.006)

-0.601**

-0.631***

-0.547**

-0.002

-0.001

-0.003

0.383

0.227

0.292

1.286***

0.918***

1.390***

0.948*

0.937*

0.585

0.986***

0.490**

0.398

0.961*

0.492

0.575

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

0.82
108

0.81
105

0.80
104

(0.228)
(0.004)
(0.233)

(0.306)
(0.560)
(0.288)
(0.530)

(0.225)
(0.005)
(0.251)

(0.346)
(0.542)
(0.238)
(0.366)

(0.252)
(0.005)
(0.265)

(0.361)
(0.678)
(0.255)
(0.388)

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 6

Women and the Plough
Variable

Dependent Variable
female labour
force
participation rate

% of women in
ministerial level
positions

OLS Coefficient Estimates
36.748*
12.862

Constant
Identifying Instrument
percentage of national ancestral lands suited to
‘plough-positive’ crops - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn
(2013)
Baseline Controls
Historical Controls
Contemporary Economic Controls
Socio-Cultural Controls
Adjusted R-squared
N

(20.207)

(19.987)

-16.682***

-14.786***

(5.112)

(4.905)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.63
108

0.48
105

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 7

Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country IV Estimates –
Baseline, Historical, Contemporary Economic, & Socio-Cultural Controls
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013
Variable
Constant

2SLS Coeff. Ests.
-6.141***
-5.996***
(0.866)

Key Regressors
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%) - The World Bank
percentage of ministerial level positions held by women in 2012
- The World Bank
Baseline Controls
log of per capita gross national income PPP in 2013
- The World Bank
average years of schooling in 2010 of those 15 or older
- Barro and Lee (2013)
Polity2 index of democracy in 2013
- Center for Systemic Peace
Continent dummy variables
Historical Controls
former British colony
former French colony
never colonised
formerly (or currently) a communist country
proportion of national ancestral lands suited to
agriculture - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
ancestral political development (index of hierarchical
levels) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
ancestral economic development (index of settlement
patterns) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
Contemporary Economic Controls
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
international trade as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
value added in industry as a percentage of GDP in 2013
- The World Bank
percentage of national land area that is potentially arable
- FAO
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(0.825)

0.011

(0.013)

0.009

(0.014)

0.716***

0.721***

(0.081)

(0.083)

-0.065**

-0.072**

(0.030)

(0.028)

0.019*

0.012

(0.010)

(0.012)

Yes

Yes

-0.071

-0.046

(0.134)

(0.143)

-0.064

-0.040

(0.149)

(0.160)

0.022

0.033

(0.142)

(0.150)

0.133

0.141

(0.147)

(0.145)

-0.003

-0.000

(0.004)

(0.002)

0.047

0.025

(0.070)

(0.072)

0.011

0.011

(0.046)

(0.046)

-0.008

-0.008

0.004***

0.004***

0.005

0.014

-0.018**

-0.014

-0.000

0.001

(0.006)
(0.001)
(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.002)

(0.007)
(0.001)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.002)

Table 7 (contd.)

Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country IV Estimates –
Baseline, Historical, Contemporary Economic, & Socio-Cultural Controls
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013
Variable
Socio-Cultural Controls
measure of national ethnic fractionalisation
- Alesina, Devleeschauwer, and Easterly (2003)
percentage of the population of European descent
- Nunn and Puga (2012)
percentage of Catholics in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Protestants in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of other Christian sects in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Muslims in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
percentage of Hindus in the population
- McCleary and Barro (2006)
Adjusted R-squared
N

2SLS Coeff. Ests.
-0.571***

-0.582**

-0.002

-0.001

0.376*

0.309

1.353***

1.188*

0.909*

0.858*

0.763*

0.470**

0.756

0.467

0.82
108

0.81
105

(0.203)
(0.004)
(0.203)
(0.299)
(0.478)
(0.437)
(0.598)

(0.229)
(0.004)
(0.275)
(0.640)
(0.493)
(0.203)
(0.335)

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Notes
1. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail#myAnchor7
2. Plato believed that “women have an inferior virtue than men” and Aristotle that “women lack
moral virtue in the same moderation”.
3. 4th century BC
4. https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-42
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